Democracy and Development by Anyang'Nyong'o, P
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 
Bv PRoF P. ANYANG' NvoNG'o* 
n the late eighties and early nineties, a number of African scholars 
carried out an intense debate in the CODESRIA Bulletin as well as the 
CODESRIAjournal, Africa Development, on the relationship between 
democracy and development in Africa 1 . This writer contended that 
democracy was good for development in Africa. And even went further 
to argue that countries which had been a little bit more democratic than others 
in terms of having civilian regimes, holding periodic elections and tolerant of 
some amount of press freedom had done much better than others. Instances 
were given of Botswana, Mauritius, Kenya, Cote d'lvoire and Senegal as the 
more regimes in Africa which were open to some democratic accountability 
through semi competitive elections, then, as compared to Nigeria, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Ethiopia and a few others2 • Part of the earlier argument then 
was that democracy was good for political stability3 . 
A fellow scholar Thandika Mkandawire strongly objected to both 
contentions that democracy was good for political stability as well as 
development4 . First, he contended that democracy was good in and of itself, 
period; it did not need to be justified in terms of its developmental or other 
outcomes. Secondly, evidence available showed that authoritarian regimes 
had done much better at achieving high rates of economic growth, and even 
development, than democratic ones. He gave as examples the Asian Tigers. 
Thirdly, those regimes in Africa that this writer characterised as "democratic", 
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except for Mauritius and Botswana, 
were not democratic at all: they were 
authoritarian regimes which tolerated 
some degree of participation in the 
political arena either within the one-
party framework or multi-party 
frameworks tightly controlled by the 
authoritarian president. 
In retrospect Thandika 
Mkandawire was right in so far as we 
could not really have a neat correlation 
between democracy and 
development in Africa at that point in 
time when there was only one real 
democracy then: Mauritius. It was 
only Mauritius which had, by 1988, 
changed its government by a new 
political party taking over power 
through a free and fair competitive 
election in 19825 . Since our debate 
was held, many more countries have 
had competitive democratic elections 
with ruling parties giving way to 
opposition challengers in at least 15 
countries. We can here mention such 
countries like Benin, Kenya, Senegal, 
South Africa and Ghana. Africa's 
much more stable democracies seem 
to score consistently higher on such 
economic growth indicators such as 
economic freedom (by the Cato 
Institute), property rights 
(Vancouver's Simon Fraser Institute) 
global competitiveness and 
economic growth rates in terms of 
GDP per capita (World Bank, Africa 
Development Bank and Davos World 
Economic Forum) 6 . Botswana, 
Mauritius and South Africa are the 
only countries that seem to 
systematically correlate their 
democratic achievements with their 
economic growth and development 
performance. Plenty of literature has 
been written on this subject with the 
American Journal of Democracy 
claiming a fair share in this discourse. 
This essay will refer to this literature 
briefly and then move on to situate 
the discourse in its African contest. 
It will begin by going back to the 
original problem: Is democracy good 
for development even if it is good in 
and of itself? What has been the 
experience of African countries in 
terms of development since "the 
democratic opening" of the early 
nineties? Is there any conscious 
efforts being made, at national and 
continental levels, to institutionalise 
democracy for purposes of 
accelerated development? 
What is good for 
Development: Democracy 
or Good Governance? 
When one-party rule was in vogue in 
Africa in the sixties and seventies, 
the debate was centered on whether 
Africa needed multi-party political 
systems in order to be democratic 
and to develop. Julius Nyerere seems 
to have won the argument with the 
powerful contention that party 
systems are historical, time-bound 
and dependent on specific political 
cultures; democracy, however, is 
Botswana, Mauritius 
and South Africa are 
the only countries that 








universal and can be practiced under 
any form of party politics, including 
the one-party political system7 • That 
was before decades of political and 
economic decay in Tanzania, largely 
as a result of very weak 
accountability by the one-party 
regime to its citizenry8 • Nyerere 
eventually accepted that greater 
political participation, engendered no 
doubt by a more pluralist political 
system, would help rejuvenate 
democracy, accountability and, 
hence, development. 
There was no better form of 
political organisation to-date, 
accepted Nyerere, than the 
multiparty political system whose 
time had also come in Tanzania by 
1991 when theArusha conference on 
Popular Participation was held, 
followed by the publication of the 
African Charter on Popular 
Participation9 • It was fully recognised 
that authoritarian and military 
dictatorships of all sorts had not only 
demobilised African people out of the 
political arena, but their balance 
sheet in terms of economic growth 
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and development were largely 
negative 10 . Unlike in Asia where 
Presidential Authoritarianism had 
paid dividends in terms of 
development, in Africa the opposite 
was the case. 
The World Bank had reacted to 
the phenomenon of economic 
backwardness and oppressive non-
democratic politics by calling for 
economic liberalisation (structural 
adjustment) and political good 
governance as early as 1981 11 . It was 
argued that good governance, defined 
essentially as managing public affairs 
accountably and transparently, was 
good for delivering services to the 
people, keeping corruption at bay in 
the public sphere and ensuring that 
the state creates an enabling 
environment for the private sector to 
create wealth as well as employment 
opportunities. With good governance 
came the call for the state to get out 
of meddling in the economy, hence 
fast-tracking privatisation and 
massive retrenchment in the public 
service. 
A lean and keen bureaucracy 
running a prosperous economy in 
which the private sector was in the 
driving seat of economic growth and 
development was expected as the 
outcome in such places as Ghana, 
Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and 
Tanzania - some of the early 
"structural adjusters". But as the 
latest UNDP report on lnequality12 
shows, this model of growth may 
create wealth for a few but it will not 
create jobs for the army of the 
unemployed nor will it drastically 
reduce poverty for the majority. 
Although there has been growth in 
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GOP per capita among the 
successful "structural adjusters", this 
growth does not translate into 
sustainable development; hence, we 
are once more being haunted by the 
age old dichotomy between growth 
and development that the 
Dependencia Schoo/ warned us about 
in the sixties and seventies13 . 
Arguments have therefore been 
advanced that neither the vote nor 
good governance by themselves are 
enough; people need more. People 
need to be governed and yet to 
control their governors: that is what 
democracy is all about. But people 
also need to eat well, live in good 
houses, be treated when they are 
sick, wear good and warm clothes, 
travel safely in means they can afford 
and which get them to their 
destinations in time, take their kids 
to school and live in environments 
where they feel at home: this is what 
development is all about. When 
people vote periodically but the 
president, a member of parliament or 
councillor still acts beyond the control 
ofthe voter and life remains the same, 
such "democracy" will be met with 
cynicism from the voter. It is what an 
American political scientist once 
called "democracy for the few"14 . 
In a draft manuscript prepared 
for the World Public Sector Report, 
Adam Przeworski, referring to H.W. 
Singer's work in 1965, notes that while 
democracy may encourage economic 
growth, economic growth itself is not 
inconsistent with rising 
unemployment, increasing inequality 
and increasing poverty: growth can 
be "immiserating"15 . The debate has 
therefore been to go beyond mere 
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When people vote 
periodically but the 
president, a member 
of parliament or 
councillor still acts 
beyond the control of 
the voter and life 
remains the same, 
such "democracy" 
will be met with 
cynicism from the 
voter. 
growth and to embrace wider aspects 
of life when we talk about 
development. Thus development 
involves a multifaceted process of 
structural transformations of the 
economy, of the society and of 
politics. By examining only three 
aspects of human development -
income, education and infant 
mortality - Przeworski seeks to find 
out how developmental 
"democracies" and 
democracies" are in 
"non-
various 
continents. His conclusions are 
worth noting. 
To begin with there are good 
reasons to expect that democracies 
should promote economic growth 
much better than non-democracies16 . 
Although economic growth may 
engender problems such as 
enhanced inequality in the short run, 
in the long run democracy stands a 
better chance of addressing these 
than non-democracy. 
Secondly, democracies 
withstand political changes in terms 
of chief executives (presidents, prime 
ministers) much better than 
autocracies; hence, they are more 
prone to political stability and 
predictability which are both good for 
business as well as development. 
Compare, for example, the 
breakdown in Cote d'lvoire in 1990 as 
compared to the less traumatic 
democratic change of chief 
executives in South Africa in 1994. 
Thirdly, while it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which political 
participation (democratic elections) 
by the poor affect income distribution 
(poverty reduction) as well as 
economic growth rates, it can be well 
argued that politicians who expect 
votes from the poor will most likely 
pay attention to the economic plight 
of the poor in order to be re-elected 
to office. The more open and 
competitive the electoral process is 
the more likely that the search for 
office through this process will lead 
to politics of inclusion and economic 
redistribution. Both, however, are 
double-edged: they can also slow 
down the process of accumulation 
and economic growth, especially 
where the revenue base of the state 
is very narrow and/or bureaucratic 
corruption is difficult to contain. 
NEPAD and the African 
Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) 
For the first time since independence 
African governments- at least those 
which have acceded to the APRM 
process - have accepted to assess 
themselves on the basis of 
democratic and developmental 
performance based on a carefully 
worked out instrument of peer review, 
which provides ample opportunities 
for horizontal learning experiences 
within the nation and across national 
boundaries. Political governance, 
economic governance, corporate 
governance and socio-economic 
development indicators have been 
identified in this instrument such that 
in-country self assessment as well 
as audit by panels of qualified 
reviewers can assess the extent 
reforms and development initiatives 
are being institutionalised and their 
depth of effect on the life chances of 
citizens being felt. 
Governments may thereby be 
able to discern more accurately how 
growth translates into development 
and what challenges and 
opportunities arise out of certain 
demands for reforms. For example, 
when the National Rainbow Coalition 
Government (NARC) was elected to 
power in Kenya in December 2002 -
with an overwhelming mandate on the 
ground that it would overhaul the 
presidential authoritarian regime and 
enact a new democratic constitution 
within the first 1 00 days of being in 
power - it raised tremendous 
expectation on the part of the 
electorate. This, however, did not 
happen. 
When the APRM exercise was 
carried out in Kenya in 2004-2005, 
citizens expressed great concern 
regarding the stalling of the 
constitutional review process. They 
also disapproved of corruption in the 
public service, bureaucratic 
What has been 
known as good 
governance - which 
essentially is an 
omnibus concept that 
includes such notions 
as rule of law, respect 
for human rights, 
promotion of property 
rights, transparency 
and accountability in 
the public service, 
low transaction costs 
in doing business 
and so on- is 
generally accepted in 
the APRM process, as 
elsewhere, as a 
necessary condition 
for development in 
Africa. 
bottlenecks for doing business, 
growing inequalities, pervasive 
poverty in urban and rural areas, 
violence and insecurity and little 
protection of the property rights of 
hawkers and women. They 
appreciated government initiatives for 
free primary school education and 
devolution of funds to local 
communities, through Constituency 
Development Funds (CDF) and 
bursaries for few students in 
secondary schools and middle level 
institutions, but decried lack of 
accountability in disbursing these 
funds. They made further 
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recommendations for improvement in 
performance. 
If government improves its 
performance, delivers services better 
and improves on the investment 
climate as a result of listening to 
these voices emerging from the 
APRM process, it will have gone a 
long way to demonstrate that 
democracy helps development. Adam 
Przeworski has put it more 
poignantly: 
"Democracy allows individuals 
to be public persons, to make 
their claims and their views 
known to others, to participate 
in the making of collective 
decisions. Even if these 
decisions are not what a person 
would want, they are a result of 
everyone's views being 
considered. There is a 
difference between one's views 
being counted, if only to be 
found in a minority, and not being 
counted at all. As Sen1 argued, 
'If freedom is of some intrinsic 
value in a person's life, then the 
valuation of a capability set 
need not coincide with the 
evaluation of the chosen 
element of it ... One reason is 
that choosing may itself be an 
important functioning"'2. 
What has been known as good 
governance - which essentially is an 
omnibus concept that includes such 
notions as rule of law, respect for 
human rights, promotion of property 
rights, transparency and 
accountability in the public service, 
low transaction costs in doing 
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business and so on - is generally 
accepted in the APRM process, as 
elsewhere, as a necessary condition 
for development in Africa. While 
Notes 
democracy cannot be reduced to 
good governance, the latter is an 
important ingredient of democracy. 
Beyond good governance democracy 
raises larger questions of justice, 
equity, equality and fairness. With 
democracy development is 
complete.• 
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